points to a 'homonyme Protestant' who had immigrated to the Netherlandsin other words a namesake,3 which in light of the rather unusual name, though, would be quite a coincidence. Then again there exist reference works dating from the early nineteenth century, implying that the Benedictine monk and the author were, after all, one and the same person. What could lead to a more certain answer are the archives of the publishing house van Poolsum, should they still exist. The question who wrote the book thus remains open but will be returned to in the context of the author's own reflections in the work.
The thesis that the author may have been a French Huguenot émigré gains in substance when one takes his open criticism of France and Louis XIV in the Histoire du Congrès et de la Paix d'Utrecht into account. It resembles his fierce criticism of the French delegation and their entanglement in organised prostitution, as made public in his Histoire amoureuse.4 This 'scandal history' has received much more attention in recent research-see, for example, Lucien Bély's fundamental study5-than the book under discussion here.6
What can be said with certainty, however, is that our author-a Casimir Freschot-had already established himself as a specialist on the various aspects of the War of the Spanish Succession before he authored his history of the Utrecht peace congress and the aforementioned 'scandal history' . The author opens his book with a dedication to the mayor and senators of the city of Utrecht and a preface in which he reflects on the Peace of Utrecht in general. I have already written about this matter in the context of contemporary debates about treaties of peace7 and here would merely like to mention that Freschot introduced a kind of typology of peace on these opening pages, distinguishing between four types of peace: first, the demand placed on Christians-in alignment with God's command for peace-to maintain peace; second, peace to retain a status quo; third, peace brought about by exhaustion after a long conflict; and fourth and last, hollow peace, resulting from the unwillingness of one of the parties to adhere to agreed words and documents. These are rather abstract considerations, which, in the absence of any examples being given, leave the reader to decide in which typological category the author would have placed the Peace of Utrecht.
Freschot quite rightly elaborates extensively in his Histoire du Congrès on how the War of the Spanish Succession and the concluding Peace of Utrecht can be understood only in the context of the 1659 Treaty of the Pyrenees and the ever more insecure Spanish line of the Casa de Austria. He therefore dedicates several dozen pages to the political-diplomatic-military conflicts of the 1660s: the attempts made by Louis XIV to appropriate or subject, on the basis of very weak alleged claims to the Spanish inheritance and naked aggression, large parts of Western Europe; the military events, which are described in detail; the political reversals of the Roi-Soleil, with which he time and again surprised his opposite parties. Freschot interprets the marriage alliance of 1659 as a fundamental threat to the European equilibrium,8 castigating the French attempts to thwart the invalidation of the king's renunciation of the claims to the Spanish inheritance. Freschot thus disapproves of, in all respects, the political project of the Roi-Soleil, which from the very beginning was focussed on dividing his opponents and exploiting the weaknesses in the Spanish royal house. He suggests that Louis XIV planned, after the cruel destruction of the Palatinate, further campaigns in the Holy Roman Empire9 and complains about the king's duplicity and unscrupulousness when it comes to forcing opponents to act against faith and law and to leave, contrary to all contractual assurances, alliances led by anti-French leaders. Louis' politics, such as his attempt to obtain a favourable final will from the last Spanish-Habsburg ruler, verge on the criminal. There is no question that the author was very critical of France and, more to the point, highly sceptical of Louis XIV. This finding does not provide decisive proof as to who the author was but lends, at least at first sight, further support to the thesis that the author may well have been a French Huguenot émigré. But then the work includes other enemy stereotypes as well. In the description and analysis of the history immediately preceding the war, Freschot leaves no doubt that he considers the British strategy to agree to a partition treaty without involving, or at least informing, the directly affected parties in Vienna as counterproductive, if not fatal. And his criticism of the political agenda pursued by Whitehall and of Queen Anne as a monarch only intensifies when he writes about the events after 1710. Whereas the text duly acknowledges and praises Britain's military achievements within the Grand Alliance and especially on the Iberian Peninsula, it also condemns the game played by London behind the back of the Allies following the 'ministerial revolution' of 1710. To this end it portrays the negotiations between Nicolas Mesnager and Matthew Prior as diametrically opposed to the spirit and text of the Grand Alliance of 1701. Likewise the unilateral withdrawal of British troops from the battlefields is presented as a striking breach of contract-it appears that London wanted, against expressed public opinion, peace at any price.
That the Dutch Republic in the end agreed to enter negotiations with French diplomats to achieve a separation agreement Freschot considered a further example of British malice. Apparently, the British had exploited the constitutional peculiarities of the States-General and the decision-making processes in the United Provinces to relieve the Dutch Republic, which from 1710 onwards had to increasingly guard its commercial interests, of its obligations with regard to the Alliance. The text leaves no question about the author's assessment of Britain's perfidious approach.10 A third enemy stereotype Freschot develops, at least in preliminary terms, concerns the Pope. He takes as his point of departure a letter, since reprinted in the original,11 sent by Louis XIV to the head of the Catholic Church in February 1707, asking the Pope to intervene in the conflict, to even act as an arbitrator, in order to swiftly establish a permanent peace. Freschot uses this letter, which he 'dissects' with great pleasure, not only to show the absurdity of this proposal but also to place Clement XI in the French corner and to 'expose' him as a supporter of Louis XIV.12 With good reason, so Freschot implies, the Curia distanced itself from intervening in the negotiations as an 'arbiter christianitatis' as such an effort was doomed to fail. In contrast, it would have been quite possible to imagine the Republic of Venice, the 'other' traditional negotiator, assuming a peace-enhancing role, at least with regard to the French-Imperial negotiations. 13 Freschot describes the actual 'negotiations' in Utrecht in a manner that leads one to conclude that he was an eyewitness-and not a journalist who exploited the periodicals published in the city, e.g. the Gazette d'Utrecht or the bi-weekly Quintessences edited by Mme Du Noyer.14 In Utrecht, which had been chosen as the place of negotiations on the advice of the British queen,15 toute cette lettre, quelque longue qu'elle soit, parcequ'elle est une preuve authentique du procédé irregulier de la Cour de Londres, par raport aux Alliez, & qu'elle étoit déja gagnée en faveur de la France dés avantqu'on eut commencé le Traité de Paix, ne se servant des demonstrations & des protestations qu'on faisoit faire à la Reine, que pour mieux tromper, attirer & faire tomber les Alliez dans la necessité de souscrire la Paix, telle qu'il plaisoit à l'Ennemi commun de la prescrire, après avoir gagné les Ministres de cette Princesse, pour qu'ils se servissent de son nom, afinque de faire valoir leurs ménées' . (325f.) 11 Freschot, Histoire, 86-89. 12 Clement XI (elected in 1700) was certainly not a French 'creature' in the beginning but was gradually pushed by Austria's politics in Northern Italy towards the anti-imperial camp. The attempts made by the Pope to arrive at a peace, as mentioned by Freschot, link to a multitude of other attempts to achieve the same outcome; cf. Ludwig Frhr. everything had been prepared with the utmost care: to avoid any breaches of protocol, a room had been made available in the town hall which could be accessed from opposite sides; further rooms served the internal discussions of the two parties.16 In addition, to avoid any ceremonial mistakes, an agreement had been reached for the respective envoys to enter the main room without any pomp and circumstance. Nonetheless, the 'negotiations' , ultimately few in number, did not produce anything more significant than an agreement that neither an intermediary nor a keeper of the minutes should be involved. Some envoys, such as the Imperial negotiator Count Sinzendorff, preferred to stay in The Hague rather than to travel to Utrecht, arguing that the substantial negotiations between the British and the French representatives had already been conducted in London. The results of these had been presented to the other delegations more or less as a fait accompli. From this point of view, Utrecht was merely used for a last round of negotiations to arrive at a peace and was entitled to take pride only in a series of bilateral peace treaties having been signed within its walls. There are several reasons that support the assumption that the text is, indeed, an eyewitness account: the precision with which Freschot describes the (dull) entrances of the envoys; the insights he offers into the social life, which he commences with an account of the ball organised by the wife of the British envoy, John Robinson, the Bishop of Bristol; and the meticulousness with which he writes about an incident involving Dutch and French servants, which he attempts to evaluate in terms of international law.17 He is disappointed that the treaties were not signed and, after ratification, exchanged in the town hall but in the private quarters of the envoys, or even in an open field (!), and complains, at least between the lines, that the city of Utrecht was thus denied a spectacular set of peace celebrations.
Nonetheless, the (presumed) eyewitness Freschot rather hesitates when it comes to divulging details about the social workings of the peace congress, which in light of the extended periods of inactivity allowed the respective parties to spend their time other than at the conference table or in private political discussions. The reason for this must be that Freschot did not want to distract from the abovementioned Histoire amoureuse . . ., which was published at the same time. Further, it can be assumed that he considered his Histoire du Congrès a serious piece of contemporary historiography and did not want this work to diverge from accepted historical writing.
What is certain is that Freschot was no longer an eyewitness at the succeeding peace congresses in Rastatt and Baden that engaged Prince Eugene of Savoy and Marshall Villars as the Imperial side had shown itself unable to sign documents which it had not negotiated. Likewise Freschot was absent in Baden / Aargau, where an entire guard of European principalities assembled to do little more than translate the Treaty of Rastatt from French into Latin.
Freschot therefore devotes few pages to these two peace congresses, referring the reader instead to the official publication of the congress papers, the Actes, Mémoires et autres pièces authentiques concernant la Paix d'Utrecht, for which, in turn, he was responsible and which were published by van Poolsum in 1714/15. This publication continues to serve scholars, the interim plan for a new edition of the primary sources of the Utrecht peace congress aside,18 as an irreplaceable basis for their research.
Of course, Freschot's Histoire du Congrès also pays tribute to failed attempts to conclude a peace, such as the negotiations between the French diplomat Rouillé and his allied opponents in The Hague in 1709, set out almost like a chronology. 19 Freschot concisely describes the key role the possible restitution of Alsace to the German Empire and the question of Dunkirk played at the time. The preliminary articles of peace dated 18 May, as received by Torcy and Rouillé, but ultimately never executed, are also included in the volume.20 Significantly, Louis XIV is made responsible for the failure of this set of negotiations21 as well as for the Geertruidenberg negotiations of 1710, which also led to no result. 22 On the other hand, Freschot shows no interest in his Histoire du Congrès in the impact the War of the Spanish Succession had on events and interests outside Europe or in the activities of the lobbyists representing the various trading companies, who, of course, presented their cases to the chief negotiators in both London and Utrecht. He reports on the genesis of the various trade agreements as well as the Asiento contract23 and comments on the differences and animosities between Spain and Portugal, but fails to examine them against their overseas background. His perspective is first and foremost a European one-the continuation of the war beyond the sea and its repercussions on the Utrecht negotiations were of only minor importance to him.
Has the analysis of Freschot's Histoire du Congres helped to resolve the identity of the author? And has it established whether these very heterogeneous publications by Casimir Freschot should be attributed to one or two writers? Bély cites a passage from French correspondence according to which the Cardinal of Bouillon is said to have made use of the 'mordante plume d'un insigne scélérat et moine apostat bourguignon, marié à Utrecht, nommé Freschot' in his propaganda writings.24 The author is certain that the person is the writer of the Histoire du Congres. If one believes this contemporary source and assumes-whilst ignoring all the epithets-a renegade monk from Burgundy who marries in Utrecht and earns his livelihood by writing propaganda pamphlets against Louis XIV, then the puzzle is quickly solved: a Benedictine monk who first makes a name for himself by writing Catholic, antiProtestant pamphlets but who is equally critical of the Jesuits, who blames the Emperor for agreeing to a Grand Alliance with the Protestant states,25 who, for whatever reason, leaves his order and converts to some shade of Protestantism, settles in Utrecht, distinguishes himself by writing anti-French and (as shown here) anti-British publications, and works as a kind of 'in-house author' for the publisher van Poolsum, where he is also responsible for the production of the official publication of the congress papers. Such careers existed, most likely in somewhat larger numbers at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Less frequent were cases of reconversion: Knopper-Gouron, who also assumes a linear and unbroken career, has established that the (one?) person by this name was 'reintegrated' into the congregation of Saint-Vanne in 1718 and died in Luxueil in 1720. The thesis of the exiled Huguenot, next to whom there existed a second person of the same name, would thus be refuted. Also the dates-1718 and 1720-would not contradict the present reconstruction of what was quite obviously an eventful life. But perhaps research in Utrecht itself, whether in the registry office or in the publishing house, will reveal further findings and will further substantiate the assumption set out here.
Translated by Uta Protz.
